ABSTRACT
The "public-danger exception" applies in the context of law enforcement officers questioning suspects before reading them their so-called Miranda rights; the exception permits pre–Miranda warning questioning on matters concerning imminent danger to the public. The Supreme Court went against precedent and outlined the foundation for a public-danger exception to the dictates of Miranda. In 1966, the US Supreme Court handed down its five-four decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, which sought to protect suspects in custody by requiring officers to provide a set of prescribed warnings before they interrogate suspects about alleged crimes. The Court endorsed as being justified the officer's actions to retrieve the firearm safely, because the benefits of abating public danger outweighed the costs of the non-Miranda interrogation. The dissenting opinion, along with the concurrent reasoning of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, sharply criticized the majority's reasoning because it weakened the integrity of Miranda warnings, leading to what Justice O'Connor called "constitutional uncertainty."
