ABSTRACT
Efforts to consolidate governments are relatively rare, and successful con solidations rarer still (Feiock and Carr 2000). The creation of special dis tricts is a far more frequent phenomenon, to the point that more special districts have been established in both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas than any other kind of government (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997). In his theo retical foundation set out in chapter 4, Allen Brierly demonstrates that spe cial districts offer more efficient service delivery mechanisms for citizens than can be provided through a centralized, consolidated government. It may be, then, that special districts are more widespread than consolidated gov ernments because of their greater efficiency. I suggest, however, that special districts are more commonly created than governments are consolidated be cause of the lower political transaction costs associated with the creation of districts than with the consolidation of governments. Any effort to create institutions or to modify existing ones is subject to collective action prob lems (Olson 1965; Bums 1994), but the lower transaction costs of special dis trict creation simplify the collective action problems of institutional change. This notion is explored in examining the distinguishing features of special districts, theories of polycentric versus consolidated governments, and the his tory of special districts in the United States. In the process, the advantages and disadvantages of special districts as a government form are highlighted.
