ABSTRACT
The chapter summarizes conclusions of a study examining how democratic states respond to the dilemmas posed by anti-system parties. It examines party ban decisions in Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany and concludes that party bans are likely to occur when (1) the ambiguity of an anti-system party about the appropriateness of political violence (2) facilitates a securitization of that party as an existential threat and identification of the party ban as a solution to that threat, and (3) this is accepted by party-ban-veto-players. On the other hand, a party ban initiative is likely to fail if veto players cannot agree it is appropriate to ban a party. Legalization of banned parties is likely to occur when (1) veto players accept (2) a desecuritization of anti-system parties as an existential threat and, consequently, the inappropriateness of a party ban. In contrast, (1) the availability or otherwise of effective alternatives to party bans or (2) incentives of partisan party-ban-veto-players to cooperate with, rather than ban, anti-system parties, do not emerge as important explanations for party ban or legalization decisions.
