ABSTRACT
In a federal political system the subnational tier of government – the Laender – is of great importance. The impact of EC membership on the legislative and executive powers of the Laender was outlined in Chapter 5 and found to be significant. The reaction of the Laender governments was to seek to regain these powers either through the Bundesrat or through other channels associated with the concept of cooperative federalism. This concept is of paramount importance to an understanding of the spirit of Laender participation in EC policy-making, if not so much in formal constitutional provisions. When represented – whether in the Bundesrat or in the less formal committees of cooperative federalism – the Laender can perhaps be regarded as a privileged interest group. Using Caporaso’s terminology, they are institutional interest groups’; although governmental agencies, they represent interests of their own at higher levels of government.( 1 ) The interests which they represent revolve around the fact that they administer a large part of EC legislation and are responsible for law-making in many policy areas where domestic legislation is concerned. The theme of this chapter, therefore, is that the Federal Government recognises the Laender as priviliged interests in relevant EC policy-making areas. Their priviliged position stems from the Federal Government’s recognition of their status in the constitution. Further, the federal level is dependent on the expertise of the Laender governments in many EC policy areas. This is underpinned by an atmosphere conducive to shared policy-making, wherein governmental official negotiates with governmental official. It is therefore argued that the spirit of cooperative federalism reveals the two leitmotivs of the thesis – negotiations characterised by expertise and decentralisation – in their most extreme form.
