ABSTRACT
This chapter explores Friedrich Nietzsche's meta-psychology, that is, his views about the composition and individuation of the self. The meta-psychological investigation focuses on his claims about consciousness and his analysis of the composition of the self. Nietzsche rejects a substantive self and criticizes the role that consciousness has played in establishing the existence of a substantive self. He is prepared to allow that it is the logical and causal precursor of reflective consciousness and that both access consciousness and reflective consciousness are perspectival. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche offers an account of how drives, perceptions, sensations and affects get bundled together into persons that is a variant on reflective consciousness but not really reducible to it. This variant is the memory criterion of personal identity, and is widely thought to be the most viable criterion of personal identity. Finally, it focuses on how the bundle view of the self supports the perspectivity of synchronic and diachronic identity.
