ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that an enquiry into the metaphysical implications of science. The aims of metaphysics are different from those of science, and the structures of metaphysical explanations are different from those of scientific explanations. Metaphysical explanations all proceed from the premise that truth supervenes on being. The methodology of metaphysics is not that of science. The much more highly developed semantic theory of truth cannot be taken seriously, even as a rough guide to metaphysics, unless you want to be a possible world's realist. That is, the objective concept of probability is the one required for the measurement of objective chances, and the objective concept of truth is the one required for metaphysics. Metaphysical necessitation is the relation that holds between things in the world and the things they make true. In today's terms, Helmholtz's ontology was one of material things with causal powers of various kinds, by which they both are known to us and affect each other.
