ABSTRACT
In the two chapters I have devoted so far to normative ethics, I have said little or nothing about rules. is might seem surprising. When philosophy students rst begin thinking about normative ethics, they usually assume that it is mainly about rules, or at least basically about rules. But this certainly is not true of either virtue ethics or utilitarianism. ( is is not true, at least, if it is speci c rules you have in mind. You could see these theories’ accounts of rightness as rules in themselves, so that virtue ethics becomes identical with some rule such as “Always do the action that the virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances”, and utilitarianism becomes identical with some rule such as “Always do the action with the best consequences for happiness or pleasure”. But this is not what people usually mean by talking about rules.)
It is not that either virtue ethics or utilitarianism is necessarily hostile to rules. Both theories can involve laying down moral rules,
including, quite possibly, unbreakable rules. (Or at any rate, rules that a moral agent should view as unbreakable, which is not quite the same thing.) Rules are obviously an important part of rule utilitarianism, and of some other “two-level” utilitarian theories (see §9.7). However, the rules are not fundamental in any of these theories, not even rule utilitarianism. For virtue ethicists and utilitarians, the point of having a rule against, say, stealing is that the recognition and practice of such a rule is necessary if human beings are to live well. e rule is not basic or fundamental. In both moral theories, it is derived from the notion of well-being, which is fundamental.
