ABSTRACT
Spencer’s Th e Principles of Biology was not a contribution to the growth of a science such as genetics or cell mechanics. Instead, it was a theoretical enquiry about the meaning of life. is quest was limited by the conventions of mid-nineteenth-century philosophical discourse, but nonetheless it contains interesting speculations about the nature of empirical investigation and the growth of knowledge. To Spencer, philosophy was not an abstract discourse; it was the pursuit of actual knowledge of nature in a way that could be seen as well as thought. Since nature was visible in forms and shapes, his questions about it were framed so as to account for these. It was the living part of nature that chiefl y concerned Spencer in his mature biological writing, so he limited philosophical questions so as to exclude objects or systems that were not animate. at is, he concentrated on plants, animals and social systems. His answers were designed to combat the notion that living things possessed meaning because they were directed by some internal force. A proper search into the signifi cance of life avoided probing between, and underneath, surface shapes for hidden clues. Such deep analysis would be guided by the rubric that what was casually visible in the universe was its actual face. “Superfi cial” knowledge was all that should be attempted; any attempt to investigate the underpinnings of nature would only uncover rational and functional laws, not answer questions about meaning.
