ABSTRACT
In the s Spencer’s political writings displayed few philosophical features that would have struck his contemporaries as novel. His views resembled those held by other mildly unorthodox Christian radicals in the Midlands and the north of England. ere was no hint of the secularizing metaphysics he developed later; nor was there, as yet, any thought that human beings were subject to instinctive impulses. At this early point in his intellectual career, Spencer perceived both individuals and societies as infl uenced by psychological or biological motors, but not as driven by them. He imagined that human beings progressed by following invariable laws given by God. ese laws were natural because they were based on the balanced and organic forces of the universe. In brief, “nature will be obeyed”. Mankind was simply one part of a harmonious living creation. As a political consequence of this Spencer insisted that existing constitutional arrangements be scrutinized to see whether they were necessary, rather than artifi cial, contrivances. If they were the latter, they would interfere with that beautiful self-adjusting principle that traded off competing social interests.
Under Spencer’s theory, a community, a nation or an individual was a natural projection of humanity. Even a government was a natural edifi ce. None of these entities had priority over the others; in terms of either importance or time they were equal. is proposition placed many constraints on “ e Proper Sphere of Government”, Spencer’s fi rst serious writing on political theory. For example, it meant that he could not successfully employ a social contract argument, because he believed that since governments were natural, they had not been artifi cially formed as a result of each individual’s rational calculations. Spencer’s treatment of individuals, communities and institutions as equal products of social evolution makes his ideas opaque to political theorists whose language has been shaped by classical discourse. eir questions would not be apposite. If, for example, they were to enquire about the relationship between Spencer’s notion of community and his idea of the state, they would fi nd that this could not be answered because the latter part of the question refers to an abstract identity, the state, about which he had little to say. Spencer did make many comments about the proper functions
of government, but he tended to view these as effi cient features of an organization rather than as factors that would make authority more acceptable to the governed. In addition, Spencer did not perceive progress as a consequence of citizens sacrifi cing themselves to the public good but, eventually, concluded that this would prevent progress. is comment, however, anticipates Spencer’s mature political theory, when evolution suggested to him that individuals should not be regarded as citizens, but as unintended benefi ciaries of improvements in the quality of life. ese results occurred when political institutions operated eff ectively because they had developed confl ict-avoidant procedures and functioned using legal and administrative procedures. is was not a lesson for citizens as the individual and the government would not operate in harmony, and benefi ts achieved by the former were not in response, or reaction, to changes in the latter. is was an antirepublican stance, and was not fully articulated until Spencer wrote his political sociology a quarter of a century in the future. In his early writings he could still propound the traditional notion that authority was legitimate because it rested on the submission of the populace.
