ABSTRACT
John Locke’s criticism of innate ideas and knowledge is part of his general theory of scientific knowledge. This chapter focuses on Locke’s criticism of innate speculative truths. His main target is Descartes, who held that innatism is necessary to defend the reality of scientific knowledge, but both their theories have their roots in the medieval theory of science. Descartes holds that innate knowledge is not a bare potentiality, but is formed at birth; the role of experience is to bring it to consciousness. Locke’s view is based on his rejection of innate knowledge, his empiricism and his Epicurean atomism. Locke’s positive theory is that all ideas are based on simple ideas derived from experience. So far we have been dealing with Locke’s empiricist theory of three of the major propositions about real existence: ourselves, God and external objects. Locke thinks knowledge of physical real essences is logically possible, since God could have given us the means to know them empirically.
