ABSTRACT
In moral theory, as in so many areas of philosophy, Wilfrid Sellars thinks that rationalism, generally called intuitionism in ethics, best captured the grammar of ethical concepts, but contaminated it with platonizing factualism. Action theory is the general account of the connection between thinking and acting; it clarifies the action-behaviour distinction, the notions of intention, volition, acting on impulse versus acting for reasons and so on. It is philosophy of mind, but it is also continuous with ethical theory, in Sellars's view, for ethical theory is devoted to an account of the principles by which some actions can be singled out as universally and intersubjectively incumbent on agents. After examining Sellars's general theory of action, the chapter focuses on his account of ethics. Just as the notion of a language-entry transition underlies Sellars's theory of observation and empirical knowledge, the notion of a language-exit transition underlies his discussion of action and practical reason.
