ABSTRACT

Husserl explicitly connects the sense of immanent transcendency with the transcendental idealism of phenomenology, and therefore maintains that the objective world as an idea is essentially related to intersubjectivity, as its ideal correlate. First, the transcendental Ego described in Husserl's account of the inseparability of its self-constitution and the objective world's constitution is the all embracing eidos, transcendental Ego as such, which comprises all pure possibility-variants of his factical Ego and this Ego itself qua possibility. Husserl's account of the constitution of objectivity in the immanent transcendency of the intersubjective community of monads, a community that is itself constituted in the sphere of ownness of each concrete transcendental Ego, occurs by his own admission within "the naivete of apodicticity". The fourth and final stage of Husserl's phenomenology represents an attempt to begin to provide an account of what its third stage calls the mode of its cognition's apodicticity.