ABSTRACT
Husserl's articulation of the phenomenological problem of history focuses on the involvement of both kinds of sedimentation with the problem of constitutive origins and the two distinct yet interrelated aspects of what is sedimented in each case. Hence the motivation is not provided by any new-found interest in history on Husserl's part, but by his recognition that the phenomenology of internal temporality is not up to the task of disclosing these original foundations. Husserl's liberation of the problem of origin from the naturalistic distortion of psychologism and historicism is, as people have seen, achieved through the phenomenological reduction, which brings about the phenomenologist's fundamentally different attitude over against the empirical psychologist's towards the mind or psyche. It is precisely this backward reference that allows for the uncovering of the history of significance of each meaning formation, which describes its genesis as a constitutive accomplishment of transcendental subjectivity.
