ABSTRACT
Husserl's account of how the eidetic possibility of an object's intentional unity contains the sedimented history of its own constitution is guided by two limits. Two "histories", then, are initially at issue in Husserl's phenomenological account of the eidetic possibility of an object's intentional unity. The first history concerns the possibility of such an object retaining its unity as an enduring presence once it has been presented to consciousness. The second history concerns the possibility of the object's original presentation to consciousness. The chapter discusses the basis for what Husserl recognized as an essential connection between intentional history and the historical development that takes place within natural time. The distinction Husserl makes between the history of the meaning belonging to the categorial formations of an object's identity, when this identity is immediately given to consciousness as the finished product of a constitution, and the sedimented history proper to this meaning's original constitution by intentional accomplishments.
