ABSTRACT
Heidegger presents his critique as stemming from phenomenology's most basic principle, the "return to the things themselves", and as a "phenomenological" critique. Heidegger's ontological critique has in turn two interrelated moments. The first claims that the "being characters" (Seinscharactere) of the entity that exhibits intentionality as an essential structure are not originally secured by Husserl. The second claims that the "meaning of Being" that guides Husserl's formulation of intentionality in terms of the "immanent" being of the intentio and the "transcendent" being of the intentum is attained by going back not to the matters themselves proper to the entity that has the structure of intentionality but to a traditional idea of philosophy. Thus Heidegger claims that Husserl's phenomenology determines the being of intentionality on the basis of that region of being, namely consciousness, in which intentionality can become the object of an absolute science.
