ABSTRACT
Aristotle's dispute with the Platonic account of the eide takes issue with its "separation" of the "beinghood" (ousia) belonging to a genos from the multitude of single things that are encompassed by it. Aristotle's account of the eide thus takes issue with the two key tenets of Plato's Socratic account of them and the major tenet of the arithmological account, all of which presuppose that an eidos's proper manner of being is accessible through a multitude. Aristotle's critique of Plato's Socratic account of the eide does not reject outright the claim that the eide are shared in metexein but only that the things that signify. Aristotle's account of understanding therefore embraces the "first journey" (protos plous) that Plato's Socrates rejected in the Phaedo. Aristotle's account of phantasia is informed by the view that it is clear that phantasia could not be opinion along with sensing, nor by way of sensing, nor an interweaving of opinion with sensing.
