Pure phenomenology and Platonism
DOI link for Pure phenomenology and Platonism
Pure phenomenology and Platonism book
The account of the origin and development of Husserl's pure phenomenology so far has identified two important contexts for grasping as a task. First, his realization of the shortcomings of a more or less orthodox adherence to the principles of Brentanian descriptive psychology. Second, his realization that even a reformed descriptive psychology operated with a fundamental presupposition that prevented the proper methodical access to the ideal meanings of mathematics and pure logic generated the task of reformulating the descriptive moment of descriptive psychology as a pure phenomenology. The task-oriented character of "pure phenomenology" thus signals that it is not a finished philosophical system but a method of research and, above all, that a research agenda drives its methodology. Husserl's self-understanding of his so-called "Platonism", then, is that it is based in the simple reference to original givens that appear before pure phenomenology's methodically reflective regard.