ABSTRACT

Husserl's account of the unity of the lived-experiences that belong to the pure Ego in accordance with the primal form of consciousness, however, encounters a limit in the scope of the givenness of the unity to and by the pure regard of its reflection by the pure Ego. On the basis of Husserl's account of the reflective modification of lived-experience, one such attempt can be rejected as un-phenomenological, in so far as it transgresses the basic methodical principles of Husserl's pure phenomenology. Thus Husserl, in his initial philosophical interpretation of the aspect of the pure Ego's givenness, refuses to speculate about its unity beyond what he thinks can be maintained on the basis of its givenness in the immanence of lived-experience. However, this does not mean for him that there is a plurality of egos, as he notes that reflection on the stream of lived-experiences provides knowledge of the necessary relatedness of this stream to the pure Ego.