ABSTRACT
In just 70 days, a numerically inferior Japanese force was able to race along the Malayan Peninsula and capture the Singapore ‘fortress’. Some scholars argue that the Allied defeat at Singapore was inevitable. They argue that Singapore was already lost long ago, on the planning tables of London. Such an interpretation smacks of determinism. Faulty grand strategy of the British Empire does not really explain why the Allied ground force crumpled so quickly and easily against the Japanese onslaught. This chapter details the reasons behind the quick collapse of Britain’s ‘Gibraltar of the East’, against the Japanese blitzkrieg. The fate of Singapore was decided in Malaya. In this chapter, attention is given to tactics, training and doctrine of the Allied ground forces to explain their below average combat effectiveness. The focus hovers from operations at the corps level down to actions at company level. The bulk of the ground troops in Malaya-Singapore were Indians, so the lion’s share of attention in this chapter goes to the Indian units.
