ABSTRACT
Naturalism refutes the foundationalism of transcendental normativity in Kantian epistemology. However, this also makes it discard transcendental constructivism, which is very brilliant part in Kantianism. Transcendental constructivism emphasizes that the object of scientific knowledge should depend upon the synthesis and unification from understanding, rather than anything-in-itself. Transcendental normativity (TN) is an important view from Kantian epistemology. Naturalistic criticism on TN mainly comes from its unsatisfactory presumption of foundationalism. Naturalism implies refutation of any absolutely transcendental foundation for scientific practices. Philosophy of scientific practices (PSP) has been brought about based on the disputes of naturalism and reconstruction of transcendental epistemology. PSP seems certainly to involve characters of metaphysical naturalism, since it has already argued that normativity of scientific practice is derived from experimenter’s causal interaction with the world. Rouse believes that PSP is essentially a naturalistic approach. Rouse insists a ‘relational’ notion of causality and normativity, which argues for non-reductive relation from normativity to some brute causality, as reciprocal constructive relationship.
