ABSTRACT
Carl Gustav Hempel proposed three models of scientific explanation: the Deductive-Nomological model, the Inductive-Statistical model, and the Deductive-Nomological model. In Hempel's view, explanation must contain law so that law is logically prior to explanation. This chapter explores Wesley C. Salmon's causal/mechanical explanation model. It analyses the relation between explanation, causation, and law. It provides a critique of Salmon's account based on four aspects: mark transmission; singular causation; causation and law; ontic and epistemic conceptions. Salmon points out that Hempel's scientific explanation models falls prey to the irrelevance objection. Salmon calls for peaceful coexistence between Kitcher's top-down approach and his bottom-up approach, claiming they express two different but compatible aspects of scientific explanation. In comparison, Kitcher's top-down approach is fully compatible with the J. S. Mill, Frank Ramsey, and David Lewis (MRL) view of scientific laws and thus may generate the least debate.
