Heidegger frequently acknowledges his debt to Husserl’s phenomenology for providing an essential insight into the “genuine method” of philosophical thinking conceived not as a new technique, but as “a path toward the disclosure of objects.”4 For Heidegger, phenomenology is a way of “seeing” that refuses the self-evidence of accepted theory or prevailing opinion in order to attend solely to beings and the manner in which they disclose themselves. In this respect, he joins Husserl’s recourse to “the things themselves” (die Sachen selbst) as the abiding concern of phenomenology. But Heidegger is careful to take his distance from the “transcendental” conception debuted in Husserl’s lectures on e Idea of Phenomenology (1907) and the “idealist” tenor of its full statement in Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy – First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology (1913), preferring to develop his own appropriation of phenomenology from Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900).5 From the outset, Heidegger is unreceptive to Husserl’s claim that transcendental phenomenology ful lls the ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science. While Husserl holds that the transcendental reduction allows the intentional life of consciousness to be described without metaphysical presupposition, Heidegger maintains that Husserl’s project is bound by onto-
3. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (eds and trans.) (London: Continuum, 2004), 470.