Nietzsche and for ignoring twentieth-century developments apart from “the Philosophy of Logical Analysis.”2

While there was interaction and discussion between the various schools and traditions, the Second World War seemed to have had a decisive impact and, in the postwar years, the two traditions grew apart and developed separately from one another, leading eventually to a kind of détente, although one based largely on mutual ignorance. Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, and Paul Ricoeur are rare examples, in the period under discussion, of European philosophers who sought to incorporate the insights of Wittgenstein, Austin, Searle, and others. Meanwhile, anglophone analytic philosophers, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, simply paid no attention to phenomenology and its European followers.3 It was not until the end of the 1970s that analytically trained philosophers such as Richard Rorty began to pay close attention to Husserl, Heidegger, and the phenomenological tradition.4 e “analytic” response to phenomenology in fact has to be found largely on the European continent and then within the larger neo-Kantian tradition.