ABSTRACT
When liberalism takes the form of a comprehensive doctrine, as Rawls suggests it does with Kant and J. S. Mill (PL: 78, 145, 159, 199; JFR: 33, 191), it:
includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole. (PL: 13; cf. JFR: 14)
Comprehensive liberalism moves beyond affi rming the equal liberty of citizens in political life to endorsing autonomy and individuality as personal goods and goals, to be pursued across several areas of life. Political liberalism, by contrast, “does not seek to cultivate the distinctive virtues and values of the liberalisms of autonomy and individuality” (JFR: 157; cf. PL: 98, 200).1 However, Rawls concedes that “the comprehensive doctrines of most people are not fully comprehensive” (JFR: 197) and so acknowledges partially comprehensive doctrines that comprise “a number of, but by no means all, nonpolitical values and virtues and [are] rather loosely articulated” (PL: 13; cf. 152 n.17, 175). Partially comprehensive doctrines are “neither systematic nor complete” (JFR: 33; cf. PL: 13).
