ABSTRACT

Introduction As stated in the introductory chapter of this volume, Europeanization can be observed in three domains, namely polity, politics and policy. While the three domains are obviously interrelated, this chapter will focus on the polity, i.e., the institutional architecture of the domestic system. The main arena of institutional reform has been the process of constitutional change, although the impact of Europeanization has also been evident in changes in a considerable number of ordinary laws. The “outcome” of this Europeanization process can best be described as one of “accommodation” as defined in the Introduction, in that the “EU policy/norm/practice causes tension but alters the national system only slightly.” The current Turkish Constitution of 1982 was the product of the military regime of 1980-1983 (the National Security Council, NSC, regime), and was made in an exceedingly undemocratic and unrepresentative fashion. The fivemember military junta played the key role in the making of the constitution. The civilian wing of the so-called Constituent Assembly was a totally appointed body with no representative character and played only a consultative role in the process, in which the final word belonged to the five-member NSC. Political parties, by that time closed down by the military regime, were totally excluded from the process. The text thus prepared was submitted to a referendum whose democratic legitimacy was extremely dubious and was adopted by a 91.37 percent majority (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, pp. 19-20). The constitution adopted in such circumstances clearly reflected the illiberal, authoritarian and tutelarist mentality of its military founders. Thus it considerably narrowed down the arena of civilian politics by introducing a number of tutelary mechanisms directly or indirectly controlled by the military; it put political parties in a straightjacket of formidable bans and limitations; and it gave much greater priority to the strengthening of the authority of the state than to individual rights and freedoms (Özbubun 2011, Chapter 2). Clearly, the institutional architecture established by the constitution of 1982 constituted a “misfit” as far as European standards are concerned. Indeed, EU conditionality requires that a country adopt “the fundamental political principles of the EU,

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the norms of human rights and liberal democracy, and the institutions of the market economy. These rules are not only fundamental for the EU, but for the entire western community of states.” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir 2005, pp. 211-12.) Small wonder that the constitution of 1982 became a subject of intense criticism and debate almost from the date of its adoption. Consequently, the last 30 years of Turkish politics have been dominated by debates over constitutional change and the making of a new constitution. In the process, the constitution has been amended 18 times, sometimes in major and sometimes in minor ways. The cumulative effect of such amendments has been a considerable degree of democratization and liberalization in the Turkish political system. Most observers agree, however, that these amendments have not been sufficient to completely liquidate the illiberal, authoritarian and statist legacy of the NSC period. Hence, Turkey’s search for a new constitution is still going on at the time of this writing. During much of this period of constitutional and legislative reforms, Turkey’s quest for EU membership provided a powerful stimulus for democratization and liberalization, as will be spelled out in the following sections. This should not lead us, however, to underestimate the domestic dynamics of democratization. Economic growth as a result of market economy reforms, the increasing vitality of civil society organizations, greater exposure to mass media, and a much stronger consciousness of individual rights and liberties have significantly contributed to the democratization process. The combination of domestic and external dynamics of democratization was particularly effective in the 1999-2006 period.