ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on theory and observation. For many years, 'theory' was a dirty word in psychological science. The logical positivists were committed to the verification principle, according to which the meaning of a proposition is to be identified with its method of verification by sensory experience. Social constructionists deny that theoretical descriptions in natural and social psychological science are linguistically objective: that they are true or false by virtue of independent facts about the natural or social psychological world. Psychological states are defined generally as states apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour. The realist recognizes that the epistemic viability of any theory is ultimately an empirical question. Certainly, none of the relativist or social constructionist arguments canvassed in this chapter force to conclude that it is impossible to achieve epistemic objectivity with respect to theory evaluation. Scientific realism does not of course entail the epistemic viability of any theory guarantees the epistemic objectivity of theory.
