Secure Flows, Optimized Networks
DOI link for Secure Flows, Optimized Networks
Secure Flows, Optimized Networks book
It was that vulnerability of global production networks that became painfully clear to policy-makers, security experts, and the broader public after the attacks of September 11, 2001. If, for instance, a terrorist organization succeeded in interrupting crude oil shipments to the Port of Los Angeles, Richard A. Clarke and Rand Beers pointed out, “auto-dependent Southern California would literally run out of gas within two weeks” (Clarke and Beers 2006, 190/191). Beyond envisaging risk scenarios for individual ports, existing experience with terrorist attacks on shipping and non-maritime infrastructures guided the development of new risk scenarios after 2001. As I argue elsewhere, security fantasies that emerged after the attacks produced a master narrative of risk that identifi ed the detonation of a nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb in a container-the-nuke-in-a-box scenario-as the single most imminent threat to the supply chain system (Vormann 2011).