ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that a priori bounds on posthuman possibility space (PPS) elaborates with the resource of pragmatism and phenomenology. It considers two cases of darkness: the first arising in the phenomenology of perception, the second from the phenomenology of time. The chapter illustrates the implications of transcendentally unbounded posthumanism by considering the fictional case set out in Charles Stross's science fiction novel Accelerando. Artificial neural networks can monitor the states of other neural networks, providing the basis for a form of non-propositional metacognition. Phenomenology and the pragmatist approach to meaning and mind converge at this point because the latter seems to require a phenomenological conception of a temporal horizon that structures activity in the common 'lifeworld'. Husserl's time requires a continuous modification of the now, leading to the difficulty that it is unable to decide what it is about so long as it remains a transcendental theory.
