ABSTRACT
Desire-fulfilment theory nicely avoids the experience machine objection to hedonism precisely because it makes people well-being depend fundamentally on the world being the way their want it to be, on their getting what they want, rather than simply on the hedonic quality of their experience. Having considered some of the arguments for DFT, let people look at some objections to the view. Thus when presented with the argument: the DFT theorist can respond by trying to block premise, by altering the theory to prevent its entailing. However, in this section people will examine a different strategy, one that concedes the first premise of the argument-and so concedes that DFT has the implications identified in the counterexample, but that denies premise, by denying that these implications are problematic. Hedonism is vulnerable to the experience machine objection because it gives no fundamental prudential importance to anything other than hedonic level.
