ABSTRACT
For philosophers and theorists of global justice, it is important to show that their conceptions of justice are universal rather than partial; indeed it is a central claim of most theorists of justice that all people should be treated fairly and the right to justice does not depend on where you happen to be born or what religion you are. As discussed above, Rawls’ veil of ignorance is intended precisely to overcome the limitations and constraints of rank, geography, wealth, gender and so on. Despite this, many theorists have argued that the dominant traditions of global justice theorizing are parochial, i.e. they are focussed on a narrow and exclusive set of concerns, they speak in a language only understood by a small group of English-speaking western academics, and their principles are inherently biased or prejudiced against whole swathes of the global population (see, for example, Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004; Ling, 2014; Shilliam, 2011; Spivak, 1988). Indeed, some argue that dominant traditions are Eurocentric in that they assume European values are global values and that European models of politics, society and the economy are either superior to or foreshadow the rest of the world. John Hobson (2012: 1), for example, argues that much of international political theory tends to ‘parochially celebrate and defend or promote the West as the proactive subject of, and as the highest or ideal normative referent in, world politics’. These are serious allegations which require careful consideration, study and unpacking. While there are no easy answers, doing so can enrich the broader global justice debate.
