ABSTRACT
It is unlikely that such a massive increase in trade volume could leave security policies untouched. Most of the trade volume concerns African exports of raw materials. China is today the largest importer of oil. Guaranteed access to energy sources is essential for China’s continued economic growth and therewith domestic stability and consolidation of China’s global position as a rising power. Although China is still a developing country itself, Chinese-Africa trade seems to follow traditional patterns in which external trade partners are mostly interested in extracting raw materials. Indeed, African exports to China consist to a vast extent of raw materials (see Figure 12.2); hence, securing business investment can be assumed to be essential for China. However, the means and methods with which China is engaged in African security policies are not exclusively defined by a simple formula ‘the flag follows the trade’, but depend on a number of additional conditions. While China gets increasingly immersed in the world of UN peacekeeping there are a number of China-specific features driving its participation and commitment. Compared to other members of the UN Security Council China occupies a somewhat different role. It is the only developing country in the Council but is the number one troop contributor among the permanent members. The Peoples Republic of China only took a seat on the Security Council in 1971 and thus a predominant foreign policy goal remains the ‘one China’ doctrine. Although Chinese developmental aid and trade deals do not apply Western-style political conditionality, however, the one China policy is expected to be accepted by African countries for Chinese support. In contrast to the other veto powers, China is the only country that has experienced colonial subjugation itself and thereby bases its claims to establish a common band because China and Africa share ‘similar historical experience’ and are struggling for ‘national liberation’.3 Traditionally, China is known for being rather conservative in its interpretation of classical sovereignty rights of the state, tending to favour non-intervention over human security issues. Similar tendencies can also be found in African politics. Despite the often rhetorical shift from non-intervention and state security to non-indifference and human security, in practice China and many African states share the concern that interventionist policies can easily be manipulated by big power interests. This rhetoric certainly aims to resonate with the African political discourse on the neocolonial influence of Western powers. It cannot be denied that China and Western powers are at times placed in a competitive setting in which China is the newcomer seen to be aiming to diminish Western influence.4
