ABSTRACT
Somalia certainly counts as one of the most contentious places for peacekeeping. A number of conditions have contributed to this, all equally important and challenging at the same time for any actor involved in peacekeeping. First, the long history of conflict in the country that started with the toppling of long-standing dictator Siad Barre in 1991, left a legacy of unresolved political strife and dissolution of state structures and regional secession, contributing to the reoccurrence of conflict again and again. Second, a disastrous legacy was left as a consequence of the failed UN mission in the early 1990s. The UN mission was terminated following US withdrawal after the killing in Mogadishu of 18 marines raiding a compound of a local war lord. This episode since then has tainted peacekeeping in Somalia as attempting the impossible. Subsequent to the Somalia experience, the UN insisted on peace as a minimum condition for the deployment of blue helmets. Third, the geographical location at the Horn of Africa with its reoccurring droughts and famine added extra stress to the humanitarian situation in which many Somalis have to live. Even without continuing conflict there would very likely be a need for continuous humanitarian relief. Fourth, although there has been a peacekeeping mission in Somalia since 2007, it has been bedevilled by very slow progress in the peace process, a
high number of casualties among peacekeepers and initially very reluctant international support in terms of troops contributed by African countries and financial support from overseas. Today, Somalia is most likely the one country in Africa to witness an extensive stream of international coordination efforts, truly constituting a regime complex of divided but also shared tasks. At the Somali mainland, the AU forms the focal point with the deployment of its peacekeeping mission AMISOM. It is supported by the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) which in 2013 was replaced by the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). Additionally, the EU launched three operations in and around Somalia, which are the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) for Somali security forces in Uganda, the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) against piracy or Operation Atalanta, and the Regional Maritime Capacity Building Mission in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP NESTOR). Operationally the fight against piracy is also supported by NATO and its Operation Allied Provider and Ocean Shield. These land and sea-based operations are only loosely connected and have thus led to the establishment of two separate international contact groups, one for Somalia as a country and one for counter-piracy operations. At the sub-regional level IGAD has played a facilitating role by sponsoring peace talks. In addition to these multilateral organisations, single countries have also impacted directly on the course of the Somali conflict in the country while also shaping the international reaction to it. Worth mentioning are the unilateral military intervention by Ethiopia and Kenya in the Somali conflict, the US fight against terrorism and the Eritrean involvement against the transitional government. Indeed, international involvement in Somalia is significant and unparalleled; while the domestic constellation seems to look and is convoluted with war lords, Islamist militias, secessionist regions, pirates, organised crime and a weak central government, the international response appears as only slightly less complex. Taking the existing interlinkages of regional warring groups within but also outside Somalia, the conflict has been analysed under the concept of a regional security complex.2 In this chapter we will be focusing on regime complexity, meaning the international response to the Somali crisis.
