ABSTRACT
Mali forms the last case study and follows already described patterns in which a mix of resource scarcity for peacekeeping at African sub-regional and regional level, the decisive intervention of a single state, France, diverging peacekeeping doctrines between the AU and UN and lastly local conflict dynamics have been the key variables forming Mali’s security regime complex. We have seen the involvement of ECOWAS, France, the AU, EU and UN in Mali, who either planned or deployed peacekeeping operations to the country. Missions have been deployed in parallel and in sequence in which a division of labour becomes apparent according to well established patterns induced mostly by peacekeeping doctrines and capabilities. While the EU opted for a niche contribution deploying two military and civilian training missions, the UN refused to engage in offensive combat operation and highlights its comprehensive engagement, the AU and France have shown willingness to apply peace enforcement. An overview of actors and their operations is provided in Table 15.1. As in the case of Somalia and the CAR, peacekeeping missions are not confined to military deployment of troops but also have an important civilian and political character. For example, before the UN deployed the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), a United Nations Office in Mali was opened. Likewise have ECOWAS and the AU opened offices in Mali. What distinguishes Mali from the two other cases is the relative speed with which deployments unfolded and the close coordination and institutionalised linkages that developed between major actors. From the deployment of the French operation Serval to the AU mission AFISMA and EU deployment EUTM and finally the UN mission MINUSMA only six months passed. French military attacks were first launched on 11 January 2013 and on 1 July the UN took over the AU mission. However, what looks on the surface as a determinate and smooth coordination process judged by the speed of events can hardly conceal how difficult and hard won coordination between the major players actually was. Surely the rapid deployment
of the AU and UN missions was event-driven following the swift intervention of France. In comparison to Somalia and the CAR mission planning and coordination between the most essential players was institutionalised from very early on. As with Somalia and the CAR local conflict dynamics have been essential for triggering the international response, Mali is no exception. Thus this chapter will first provide a brief overview of how the Malian crisis evolved and what deeper reaching roots gave rise to the sudden eruption of violence in 2012 before exploring the emergence of the Malian security regime complex in greater detail.
