ABSTRACT
The problem of consciousness relates to what the world is made of, how it began, the nature of selves, and above all the mind–body problem. In philosophy, dualism is the idea that mind and matter are distinct – a common belief in most societies and religions. In Cartesian dualism (described by René Descartes), mind and matter are separate substances. Objections to this, and other forms of dualism, are discussed, including Dennett’s mythical Cartesian theatre. Alternatives include materialism, idealism, and neutral monism, as well as epiphenomenalism, supervenience, panpsychism, and theories based on mind as brain in action.
In science, nineteenth-century psychophysiologists conducted experiments on sensation, perception, and memory, and William James promoted an empirical psychology based on their findings. By contrast, European phenomenologists concentrated on methods for putting subjective experience first. But difficulties with introspection helped pave the way for behaviourism, which rejected all talk of subjective experience.
Discussion of consciousness returned to psychology in the late twentieth century, initially concentrating on brain studies but later branching out into embodied cognition. Yet the mind–body problem, or the ‘explanatory gap’, remains. In 1994, David Chalmers coined the phrase ‘the hard problem’ of consciousness, to be distinguished from the ‘easy problems’ tackled by most of psychology.
