ABSTRACT
In modern Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh the category of rational indicator (al-dalīl al-ʿaqlī) that may properly be considered an independent source of Sharīʿa precepts (aḥkām) is only independent rationality (al-mustaqillāt al-ʿaqliyya), a direct function of the theological principle of the intelligibility of the praiseworthy and the blameworthy. The meta-ethical principle that has given rise to the theoretical space for this jurisprudential source has been conceived of and defended in increasingly sophisticated and nuanced ways throughout the history of Shīʿī theological thought. The resultant contributions to discussions about the nature of morality and rationality found in modern uṣūl al-fiqh reflect a culmination of some of the most sophisticated ideas of Muslim thought on questions of moral philosophy. Despite radical differences emerging in the conceptions of morality amongst modern Shīʿī scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh, we have seen in previous chapters that there is a common affirmation of a theoretical correspondence between the judgements of reason and the judgements of the Divine Legislator, albeit argued for in different ways. In the previous chapter I discussed some of the different views of Shīʿī thinkers on the questions of moral ontology, moral epistemology and the correlation between judgements of rational morality and judgements of Sharīʿa. However, as outlined in the four-part schematic offered by Muẓaffar regarding the inclusion of al-mustaqillāt al-ʿaqliyya as a substantive source amongst the evidence employed in the inference of Sharīʿa precepts, there is still one pivotal discussion remaining. The question of whether it is deemed acceptable to actually rely upon such independent judgements of reason in the process of Sharīʿa inference – the question of ḥujjiyya – has yet to be addressed. As will be seen, it is the epistemic considerations of validity entailed in the discussions of ḥujjiyya that are the major obstacle preventing al-mustaqillāt al-ʿaqliyya playing a substantive role in the inferential process of Sharīʿa precepts. Accordingly, and despite prior reference to the terms on numerous occasions, at this point a deeper analysis of exactly what ḥujjiyya and ḥujja have come to mean in modern Uṣūlī discourse is now called for. This will allow a discussion of the ḥujjiyya of the different relevant epistemic categories referred to by Uṣūliyyūn that range from definitive knowledge or certainty (qaṭʿ) to probability or mere speculation (ẓann). This background will allow for a thorough
analysis of the ḥujjiyya of al-ʿaql and the subsequent redundancy of independent rationality as a source of Sharīʿa precepts. However, to further ground the analysis offered by the modern Uṣūliyyūn on the subject, I first offer a short account of how these key epistemic considerations have been conceived of throughout the history of Imāmī legal theory.
