ABSTRACT
In the preceding discussions, we have seen that Muẓaffar acknowledges that theoretically al-dalīl al-ʿaqlī does have an independent role, alongside the Qur’ān and the Sunna, as a source of Sharīʿa precepts. This position, which is common to the majority of Uṣūlī scholars of legal theory, stems from the acceptance of a moral rationalism fundamental to Shīʿī theology. Although there is significant dispute about the nature, or ontology, of rational moral propositions, there is nevertheless agreement that some judgements of rationality, however conceived, can correspond with the judgements of the Divine Legislator, and hence lead to knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. The following is the paradigmatic example of a syllogism leading to knowledge of a Sharīʿa precept that is constructed solely from rational propositions and is thus an example of independent rationality (al-mustaqillātal-ʿaqliyya) as a source:
Justice is praiseworthy according to the judgement of [pure] rationality. Every [purely rational] judgement of reason is a judgement of the Divine Legislator. Therefore, Justice is praiseworthy according to the Divine Legislator.
