ABSTRACT
A familiar, yet still curious, feature of Nietzsche's reception over the last century is that figures with radically divergent views and methodologies all claim the mantle of his influence. Like most of the great philosophical naturalists, Nietzsche's naturalism is fundamentally methodological. Historically, M-Naturalism has constituted the most important type of naturalism in philosophy. Many naturalists go beyond methodological naturalism, however, and embrace a substantive doctrine. Any interpretation of Nietzsche as naturalist engenders five objections, objections that seem all the more powerful to readers whose picture of Nietzsche has been shaped by the dominant postmodern reading of the past several decades. Nietzsche's famous doctrine of perspectivism is sometimes thought to undermine both the idea that there is any such thing as "objective truth" and the idea that one could have "objective knowledge" of this truth. Nietzsche's alleged skepticism about causation falls prey to similar considerations.
