ABSTRACT
In contemporary Western philosophy, meta-ethics refers to an ensemble of concerns about the meaning of moral statements, whether—and in virtue of what—the statements have truth-value, and the possibility of justifying or knowing these statements. Cognitivists often claim that their position shows that morality may be objective in some way, while non-cognitivists often assert that their position shows why moral statements may be motivating or action-guiding. It is sometimes supposed that a successful meta-ethical theory would establish, in some sense, both the objectivity of morality and its capacity to direct to action. Many traditional Buddhist texts assert or imply that in various ways Buddhist wisdom brings about Buddhist morality. In any case, there is no defense of moral intuitionism as a meta-ethical theory in early Buddhism. In Mahayana Buddhism, moral statements are expressed as often as they are in earlier Buddhist traditions, though typically with the characteristic Mahayana emphasis on the centrality of compassion within the context of the Bodhisattva path.
