This chapter focuses on Wittgenstein's anti-sceptical arguments, aiming to refute scepticism. The meaning argument puts in question Wright's denial that Wittgenstein challenges the intelligibility of scepticism. Wright argues that for both Wittgenstein and the sceptic, knowledge proper " a state of cognitive achievement, based on completed enquiry" depends on groundless assumptions which we have no positive reason to affirm as true. Dream-scepticism, like scepticism about the meanings of one's words, is self-defeating scepticism. It is important to be clear about what these remarks commit Wittgenstein to. He recognises that the connections between latent nonsense and ordinary language are important, while denying that it is fully laid down in advance how we respond to new formulations. Liberals stress his readiness to find genuine uses for such nonsensical utterances, arguing that he describes, and does not prescribe, linguistic use. Liberals are closer to resolutism, but do not subscribe to it because they accept the importance of the distinction between latent and patent nonsense.