ABSTRACT

This introduction presents an overview of key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book explains the concept of sensation and that is important, for philosophers, especially the Cartesian theorists, have a tendency to use sensation, sense-data, and sensible qualities interchangeably. It also explains the thesis which is that mind is neither private nor any kind of substantival entity which is observable by its possessor alone and no one else, but that it is observable to anybody through behaviour, including linguistic behaviour, together with contextual complex in which such behaviour occurs. This thesis is the outcome of my examination of both the mental theorists and logical behaviourist theories, particularly Ryle's. According to mind-brain identity theory, mental processes are in reality the processes in the brain. The identity between the mental experiences and brain processes is not an equivalence of concepts, which could be discovered a priori, but something which is established on the basis of empirical research.