ABSTRACT
This chapter assesses what effectively became a self-imposed rupture in the United States-North Korean dialogue, which essentially lasted for the duration of President George W. Bush's first term. There were initial grounds for believing that there would be essential continuity in North Korea policy between Clinton and Bush. Incoming National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice had earlier written that Clinton's AF would be difficult politically to 'set aside'. The New York Times meanwhile had assessed Bush's position on North Korea during the 2000 election campaign as being only 'a shade tougher' than Clinton's. The prospect of North Korean retaliation against the South, the unknown state of its nuclear weapon capabilities and the position of China as its de facto ally all combined to rule it out as any kind of feasible option. A follow-up agreement did eventually arrive in February 2007, after the Treasury had agreed to a convoluted process for unfreezing the North Korean assets.
