ABSTRACT
THE mental phenomena with which we have been concerned hitherto have represented stages in one and the same great process. We have seen that ideas are derived from sensations in the regular course of development, and that both alike have a single end,—knowledge of the external world. But we have purposely neglected one very important side of our mental life. We never actually find a mind which apprehends things without joy or sorrow, and contemplates them with absolute indifference. In cognising objects we feel ourselves attracted to or repelled from them, or incited to the performance of some kind of action, according to their nature. We can, therefore, comprehend all those phenomena which are not included in the ideational process under the two words ‘feeling’ and ‘will.’ Feeling and conation always accompany our sensations and ideas; they determine our actions, and it is mainly from them that our whole mental life receives its bias and stamp of individuality.
