§ I. Relation of Feeling to Will; Impulse and Desire. § II. Development of Will. § III. Simple and Complex Voluntary Acts. § IV. Psychological Elements in Voluntary Action.

IN the previous discussion we took as our starting-point the fact that the affective side of consciousness at any moment seems to exhibit a unitary interconnection similar to that presented by its ideational contents. But further investigation convinced us that the affective unity of consciousness differs in important respects from its ideational unity. The latter appears to be external, in the sense that the particular ideas are united into a whole, more especially by the spatial relations in which they stand to each other, without the constituents of this whole being necessarily brought into any internal relation. In feeling it is quite different. It is true that several qualitatively different feelings may exist side by side, but they always give rise also to a total feeling which endows the entire group of separate feelings with an internal coherence.