ABSTRACT
This chapter remains to be discussed how the presumptive criteria operate in the balancing of values. It should be remarked that no attempt has been made here to rank whole types of valuational act. Moral theory, as opposed to casuistry, may set for itself the task of securing potent ideals for this purpose, ideals whose function is as an auxiliary to the presumptive value criteria in effecting a decision. This is no more than standard procedure for dealing with a ceteris paribus clause in an argument, moral or not. Conceptualization enters the picture as an adjunct to the operation of the criteria, with the presumptive justification offered for their continued use, the retrospective and prospective use of the criteria, and the propositional formulation of them. That is, the features of life here treated as value criteria also operate as motives for action independently of what has here been called valuation. For one thing, the 'cumulativeness' asserted for values may be questioned.
