ABSTRACT
The Grand Fleet possessed a numerical advantage of 37 127 in heavy units, 37:21 in modem capital ships and 113:72 in light support craft. Hipper charted a course south-east in order to fall back on the High Sea Fleet, about fifty miles to the south. With the Grand Fleet only sixteen miles to the north, Beatty altered course from north-north-west to north-east in order to regain contact with Hipper, and to prevent the latter from sighting the Grand Fleet. More important, Hipper had been denied sight of Jellicoe's armada by Beatty's brilliant manoeuvre; the Grand Fleet was now only ten miles to the north. Admiral Jellicoe had to make the decisive move to engage the Germans. Rear-Admiral v. Trotha, Chief of Operations Division, High Sea Fleet, lamented on 18 July that the battle-cruisers "were no longer operational". On 22 November, Jellicoe accepted the post of First Sea Lord; that same day, Beatty was given command of the Grand Fleet.
