ABSTRACT
We are now set to compare DCT with other theoretical family members, some of which have already been mentioned. The species metaphor implies that theories survive and evolve according to their explanatory and predictive fitness—their capacity to save the phenomena in their target domains. This simply restates the constructive-empiricist philosophy of science that guided dual coding research and theory (Chapter 2). The same fitness criteria can be applied to other representational theories. I first summarize the empirical case for DCT as the reference theory, then present examples of three classes of theories that differ more or less from DCT in their representational assumptions and empirical scope. The first alternative class has come to be called embodied cognition because the theories are grounded in the body’s interactions with the world. DCT is fully embodied according to that definition. Then I review “disembodied” computational approaches that share the single-code assumption that was the thematic contrast to DCT in the preceding chapters. Finally, I identify hybrid theories that combine features of embodied and disembodied theories in different ways and degrees.
