ABSTRACT
Intellectuals can play a critical role in the development of the public sphere and the process of democratization where other groups such as the bourgeoisie or middle class are small, powerless, or conservative. In Leninist states, where economic freedoms are limited, social autonomy and organization highly restricted, and democratic structures underdeveloped, opposition to the regime often begins in the form of moral dissent by educated elites. Critical intellectuals—those with the training, capacity, and inclination to understand and critique regime ideology—point out discrepancies between the state’s basis of legitimacy and its actions, articulate mass grievances, and provide alternative visions of truth. In post-Mao China, critical intellectuals, despite their commitment to many democratic ideals, have been unable to build, enforce, and protect social and institutional foundations for democracy. This chapter analyzes structural and cultural conditions that preclude intellectual autonomy, organization, and mobilization for political purposes in China. They include the state’s coercive powers, patterns of patronage, an emphasis on cultural rather than institutional change, and the lack of elite-mass linkages. I briefly introduce Poland as a model of communist transition forged by an alliance of intellectuals and workers, and then compare state-society relations, opposition strategies, and elite-mass linkages in China.
