ABSTRACT
In this and the following chapter, we present the outcomes of coalition formation studies employing characteristic function games with sidepayments played in the experimental laboratory, and compare these outcomes to a selection of the various theoretical solution concepts presented earlier. We shall not attempt a comprehensive review of all of the coalition formation studies that have appeared in print; such a summary would be both too vast and off the main point of studying coalition formation in situations modeled by characteristic function games. In the past 25 years, over 200 articles have reported data from coalition formation games, most of them employing the Pachisi or Political Convention experimental paradigms (see Chapter 11). This literature has been periodically surveyed by, among others, Burhans (1973), Chertkoff (1970, 1975), Collins and Raven (1969), Davis, Laughlin, and Komorita (1976), Gamson (1964), Lieberman (1975), McGrath and Kravitz (1982), Miller and Crandall (1980), Murnighan (1978a), Rapoport (1970a), Rapoport and Orwant (1962), Rubin and Brown (1975), Stryker (1972), and Stryker and Psathas (1960).
