ABSTRACT
Of course I am not here recommending the abandonment of this new and at tractive (if small; see Kvavilashvili & Ellis, this volume) subdiscipline of psy chology. We collectively can and should continue to examine memory for in tended actions, as Ellis (this volume) calls them, or intention memory in the words of Goschke and Kuhl (this volume). And as virtually everybody whose work is represented among these chapters is careful to stipulate, some compo nents of such intended actions are necessarily examples of retrospective mem ory. Goschke and Kuhl (this volume) explicitly aim in this retrospective direc tion with their own work. (Although their commentary on the field is perhaps the most sensitive, among these chapters, to the mixture of memory psychol ogy and motivational psychology within the specialty.) It is the other nonret rospective components I am talking about: Einstein and McDaniel (this vol ume) refer to these as noncognitive factors. I see no excuse for calling such components prospective memory.
