Conclusion

It was with some reluctance that the British Government embarked on a new anti-communist propaganda policy in January 1948. The post-War Labour Government was not averse to the use of propaganda. Although wartime propaganda agencies, such as the Ministry of Information and the Political Warfare Executive, were dismantled, substantial elements of the propaganda apparatus were retained within the Foreign Office and in a new Central Office of Information. Moreover, the Labour Government was ready to use propaganda to explain British policies abroad and, in the face of declining power, to advertise British achievements. Bevin in particular was keen that Britain should not ‘hide its light under a bushel.’ ¹ Given such enthusiasm, it was perhaps inevitable that propaganda would once again be used in an offensive capacity. However, faced with an increasingly hostile barrage of anti-British propaganda from the Soviet Union and communists around the world, Bevin initially resisted calls from senior officials in the Foreign Office to respond with offensive propaganda. Events at the end of 1947 – most notably the creation of the Cominform and the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in London – prompted Bevin to reconsider this position. He was persuaded to adopt a new propaganda policy when his Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Christopher Mayhew, combined the Foreign Office’s call for a propaganda offensive with the promotion of Bevin’s own strategy for ‘Third Force’ defence.